Formula to Stop the Illegal Organ Trade:
Presumed Consent Laws and Mandatory Reporting Requirements for Doctors by Glaser, Sheri R.
I
N 2001, MAKBUBA ARIPOVA LOST HER HUSBAND to a ring of
organ traffickers when the ring enticed him to travel abroad
with the promise of a job. Days after he supposedly left for
Canada, investigators found his mutilated body dumped in
their hometown of Bukhara, Uzbekistan. Investigators also found
the bodies of his sister, brother-in-law, and their three children,
who were supposed to emigrate with him. Authorities prosecuted
three suspects for these killings. When the police searched the sus-
pects’ home, they found evidence that Makbuba’s family and oth-
ers were victims of trafficking in organs. The police reportedly
found bags containing human body parts with missing organs, 60
passports from people who were missing, and £6,000, a large sum
of money given that the average monthly salary at the time was
£10. Investigators believe this could be the proceeds of organ sales. 
Trafficking in organs is a crime that occurs in two broad cat-
egories. First, there are cases where traffickers force or deceive the
victims into giving up an organ, as happened with Makbuba’s fam-
ily. Second, there are cases where victims formally or informally
agree to sell an organ and are cheated because they are not paid for
the organ or are paid less than the promised price. 
Currently, the international community has not responded
adequately to the problem of organ trafficking. Legal provisions
exist prohibiting this crime, but, where there are provisions, there
are often weak enforcement policies and few prosecutions. For
example, the Council of Europe, a political organization of 46
European nations, stated that even though most member states
have legal provisions against organ trafficking, many of these provi-
sions do not explicitly set out who has criminal responsibility.
Much remains to be done to reduce or eliminate illegal trafficking
in organs, such as passing and enforcing laws against the crime and
organizing public education campaigns for victims and potential
sellers. This article highlights “presumed consent laws” as the best
practice method of increasing the legal organ supply and encour-
ages nations to adopt mandatory reporting requirements for doc-
tors who suspect the organs they receive for transplants are products
of trafficking. 
First, this article explains the demand fueling organ traffick-
ing and examines the existing legal framework for this crime. Next,
this article analyzes presumed consent laws and determines
whether they work to diminish the black market for organs.
Finally, it argues that doctors should have an obligation to report
suspected cases of organ trafficking. 
SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM: SUPPLY AND DEMAND
IMPROVEMENTS IN MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY and surgical tech-
niques have increased the success rate of organ transplants, there-
by increasing the demand for organs. This demand, however, has
not been met adequately. Consequently, as of December 26, 2004,
in the United States alone, around 77 percent of the 87,364
patients on the official organ waiting list had not received trans-
plants. Because the organ supply cannot meet the rising demand,
a global black market in organs has grown and flourished. This
black market thrives internationally in many forms, although it is
extremely difficult to measure its extent due to its secretive nature. 
In China, for example, officials remove organs from executed
prisoners to use in transplant surgeries. Although China’s official
stance is to ban the buying or selling of human organs and tissues,
this practice operates nonetheless on a clandestine level and con-
tributes to the black market in human organs. The Chinese gov-
ernment has enacted regulations marked for “internal circulation
only” that establish guidelines for this practice. 
Organ trafficking has developed as a by-product of China’s
death penalty policy. To address rising crime rates, China con-
ducts “Strike Hard Campaigns.” During these campaigns, the
government makes thousands of arrests, imposing tough punish-
ments. For example, Amnesty International reported in March
2004 that China executes 15,000 people per year and that 69 per-
cent of the nation’s executable offenses in the criminal code are for
non-violent crimes. Human rights activists also report that
Chinese officials systematically remove kidneys, corneal tissue,
liver tissue, and heart valves from executed prisoners, giving them
to well-connected Chinese, or, more often, selling them on the
black market for up to $30,000.
Many facets of the Chinese infrastructure have vital roles in
perpetuating organ trafficking, including court officials who
quickly settle cases and deny death sentence appeals to ensure that
prisoners are executed at the optimal time for organ harvesting for
the recipients. Reportedly, court officials also inform doctors when
they order death sentences so that doctors know when to contact
the prison to make a match for the transplant patient. Further
reinforcing the clandestine nature of its organ trafficking policy,
one of China’s “internal” rules, the Temporary Rules Concerning
the Utilization of Corpses or Organs from the Corpses of Executed
Prisoners, enacted in 1984, states that “the use of organs of execut-
ed criminals must be kept strictly secret, and attention must be
paid to avoid negative repercussions.” Consequently, most doctors
and public officials in China deny knowledge of the practice. 
THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR ORGAN TRAFFICKING
ORGAN TRAFFICKING VIOLATES FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS,
such as the rights to life, liberty, security in person, and freedom from
cruel or inhumane treatment. As such, several international organiza-
tions have established standards on organ trafficking. These include the
World Health Organization’s Guiding Principles on Human Organ
Transplantation (1991); the World Medical Authority, which has
denounced the commercial use of organs since 1985; the Council of
Europe’s Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (1997) and
its Optional Protocol Concerning Transplantation of Organs and
Tissues of Human Origin (2002); and the Bellagio Task Force, a work-
ing group that Columbia University established to draft a document
regarding the use of organs for transplants. In addition, the UN
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons includes
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“organ removal” and its subsequent sale as an end purpose of trafficking. 
Many nations have also passed domestic laws prohibiting
organ trafficking, but the crime continues to thrive, often due to
corruption. For example, despite adopting the Transplantation of
Human Organs Act in 1994, the human organ trade is still wide-
spread in India. The Act bans the sale of human organs and all
transplants except in situations where a relative donates an organ.
There is a large loophole in the Act, however, which stipulates that
hospital authorization committees can allow non-related donors to
donate organs for transplants if they are “emotionally close” to the
patient, a term that has been very loosely defined. On numerous
occasions, these committees have determined that people who are
from different nations and speak different languages meet the
“emotionally close” standard. Dr. Sandeep Guleria, a professor at
the All India Institute of Medical Sciences, estimates that about 64
percent of all the renal transplants in India in early 2001 were from
non-related donors. 
South Africa passed the Human Tissue Act of 1983, which
states that no one can transfer any tissue, including flesh, bone,
organ, or body fluid, in exchange for payment. Individuals who
violate this Act are subject to imprisonment of no more than one
year or a fine of a maximum of $300. There is a large loophole in
this Act as well because it grants a hospital’s medical director and
pathologist the right to remove tissues and organs without consent
if the identity of the deceased person is initially unknown and rel-
atives have not come forward to claim the body within the period
when organ retrieval is medically feasible. This provision can
encourage corruption.
PRESUMED CONSENT LAWS
APPROXIMATELY 15 TO 20 NATIONS have enacted presumed consent
laws for organ donation. These laws are intended to produce a surplus
of organs for transplant surgery, establish equity in the distribution of
organs, and end any illicit trade in organs. They essentially create sit-
uations where people must opt-out of being an organ donor, rather
than opt-in, as in the United States and other countries. 
These laws vary in terms of their strength. For example, many
of the European laws are weaker, meaning they have easy opt-out
provisions. In France the family is given an opportunity to stop the
donation, even if the deceased expressed his or her desire to be an
organ donor. Where the system of presumed consent is weak, it
does not increase organ supply to the point of meeting demand.
Instead, those systems operate like the opt-in system in the United
States because people who would have chosen to remain a non-
organ-donor in the United States may stop a family member’s
donation and opt themselves out of being organ donors. Such sys-
tems do not effectively increase the supply of organs. 
In contrast, Brazil’s Presumed Organ Donor Law is an exam-
ple of a strict presumed consent law, where it is more difficult to
opt-out. The law defines all Brazilian adults as universal organ
donors unless they officially declare themselves “non-donors of
organs and tissues.” In order to opt-out, citizens must have “non-
donor of organs and tissues” permanently stamped on their civil
identity card or driver’s license. Citizens must pay for their docu-
mentation, which presents an economic hardship and thus a major
hurdle for many in Brazil. Additionally, citizens must navigate var-
ious bureaucratic obstacles in order to opt-out. For example,
authorities reportedly told Maria Celestina de Oliveira Pinto, a
domestic worker in Sao Paulo, that she was not allowed to declare
herself a non-donor when she went to get her new documents. She
reportedly had to wait in line four times and argue before she
received a “non” before the word “donor” on her card. 
Though strict presumed consent laws effectively increase sup-
ply, they may create unfair hardships on those individuals who
wish to opt-out. States that pass strict presumed consent laws
should make the process by which citizens opt-out free of charge
and simpler than Brazil’s system. 
IMPACT OF PRESUMED CONSENT LAWS
Presumed consent, when the state strictly follows it, is the best-
practice method of legally obtaining organs. In countries with pre-
sumed consent laws, there is a higher procurement rate for organs
than in countries without these laws. Many argue that if the demand
for organs were met legally, then people would have less incentive to
illegally obtain organs and the black market would eventually dimin-
ish. On a more basic level, if there were more organs available for
transplant, then more people’s lives would be saved. 
In addition, presumed consent leads to improvements in tis-
sue matching between donor organs and recipients, and it allows
surgeons to be more particular about which organs are selected.
Furthermore, these laws allow for more careful application of
brain-death criteria because the increased supply of donor organs
diminishes incentive to obtain organs through “inappropriate”
means. For example, there have been cases in Russia and Argentina
where organs were removed from comatose patients who were pre-
maturely declared brain-dead. Presumed consent also ensures that
organs are “fresher” because it eliminates the doctor’s need to con-
tact the deceased’s next of kin, thus shortening the time between
death and determination of consent. Lastly, the decision as to
whether or not to donate organs is not made during the grieving
period immediately following someone’s death. 
Financially, presumed consent lowers costs on the part of the
government. For example, in the United States, with a federally
funded dialysis program, the cost of a kidney transplant, taking into
account the cost per year after the transplant for further medical
care, is less than the yearly cost of dialysis. One could reasonably
argue that, as kidney transplants become even more commonplace,
the costs will continue to fall. If a nation has a system of presumed
consent and has more organs available for transplants, then that
nation will presumably be performing more transplants and will
have fewer patients on dialysis, thus lowering government costs.
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“This black market [in organs]
thrives internationally in many
forms, although it is extremely
difficult to measure its extent
due to its secretive nature.”
Critics argue that presumed consent will result in a situation
where only advantaged groups, such as the wealthy and educated,
will exercise their choice to opt-out because groups such as the
poor and uneducated will not be aware of their opportunity to
exercise autonomy. One solution could be to promote public edu-
cation about presumed consent laws and the opportunity to opt-
out. This would ensure that the next of kin knows that the donor
made an informed decision to donate while he or she was alive,
and that donors’ overall autonomy will be respected.
There is also the fear that a doctor will remove the organs of
someone who has opted-out, thus violating the deceased’s wishes.
While this would be a serious violation of donor autonomy, this is
much more likely to occur in situations where a nation has
imposed a system of strict presumed consent that does not require
doctors to make a reasonable search to determine whether an indi-
vidual has opted-out of the system. In order to avoid this scenario,
nations should require doctors to verify whether or not patients
have opted-out prior to removing any of their organs. 
HOLDING DOCTORS ACCOUNTABLE
IN ORDER TO REDUCE AND ELIMINATE ORGAN TRAFFICKING,
countries also should impose mandatory reporting requirements
on doctors who suspect that a patient has obtained a trafficked
organ. Dr. Nancy Scheper-Hughes of Organs Watch, a human
rights group in Berkeley, California, has commented that trans-
plant doctors have developed a “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy regard-
ing the underground trade in human organs. Although doctors
have a legal obligation to keep information about their patients
confidential, they can break this obligation on the grounds of the
“protection of the public” exception. 
The “protection of the public” exception permits a doctor to
reveal confidential information about a patient if the doctor has
grounds to think that the patient’s medical condition is a risk to
others and that disclosure is necessary to protect the public from
such a risk. The harm from a doctor breaking his or her duty of
confidentiality to a patient includes potential embarrassment to
the patient and damage to his or her reputation for the patient’s
decision to obtain an organ from a trafficked person.
Considerations of the public interest outweigh this harm, howev-
er, because organ trafficking is a risk to the public and a crime
involving egregious violations of human rights. Misleading or forc-
ing someone into giving up an organ is a violation of personal
autonomy. Furthermore, human rights are violated even when
someone agrees to sell an organ because putting a price on body
parts essentially exploits the desperation of the less fortunate.
Organ routes reportedly flow from underdeveloped countries to
developed countries, black and brown to white, and poor to rich.
Reporting is also in the public interest because the donor-
victim can end up with serious health problems due to the trans-
plant. A study in 2002 found that 86 percent of Indian organ
donors reported significant declines in their health within three
years after surgery. A study by Organs Watch found that 79 per-
cent of Moldovan donors experienced health problems after
their procedures. 
In one such case, Gheorghi Ungureanu, from Moldova, was
coerced and deceived into selling his kidney in 1999. A trafficking
ring promised him a factory job where he could earn more than he
was earning as a farmer, but instead of taking him to Israel to work,
the ring took him to Turkey to remove his kidney. They forced him
to sign papers agreeing to the removal, and now, at 48 years old, he
is no longer able to do heavy work. 
The recipient may experience health problems as well because
organs procured on the black market often do not meet the quali-
ty standards that the recipient’s home country requires. Donors
also may inadvertently impose health risks on recipients if they
conceal adverse information about their health to ensure they are
not ruled out as a potential candidate for “donation,” relinquish-
ing their receipt of any subsequent payment.
There are several additional benefits to the public interest that
would accrue from a doctor’s decision to report that a patient has
obtained an organ from a trafficked person. First and foremost, it
could save many people from organ trafficking. Reporting such an
incident to the proper authorities could be an integral way to break
up entire organ trafficking rings because reporting might lead to
questioning and prosecuting people involved in the ring. As
authorities break up trafficking rings, potential victims are saved
from being trafficked and re-trafficked by those rings. 
It is up to countries to decide whether to take steps to penal-
ize doctors for failing to report suspected cases of organ trafficking.
Since the true culprits in organ trafficking are the trafficking rings,
which lure or coerce the victims, laws should punish these people
more severely than the doctors. Doctors also play an integral part in
organ trafficking, however, because transplants would not be possi-
ble without their help. Trafficking in organs is a crime, and a doc-
tor who fails to report a suspected instance of organ trafficking fur-
thers that crime. In light of this, punishment for doctors could con-
sist of administrative, civil, or criminal penalties, depending upon
the level of their intent and knowledge. For example, if doctors
know that a transplant organ is from a trafficked person and intend
to assist the trafficking ring in performing the transplant, then the
doctors may be charged with accomplice liability. If doctors do not
have the requisite intent, then a more appropriate penalty may be
to revoke their license or impose a fine. Doctors generally know
where a patient’s transplant organ comes from, and if they suspect
the organ is from a questionable source, then they have an obliga-
tion to report their suspicions to the proper authorities. 
CONCLUSION
TRAFFICKING IN ORGANS IS ILLEGAL and violates fundamental
human rights. Currently the international community has not ade-
quately responded to this problem. To reduce or eliminate organ
trafficking, countries should (1) strengthen their laws against this
crime and remove any loopholes that encourage corruption; (2)
adopt presumed consent laws to increase organ supply legally,
which would reduce the number of organs obtained on the illegal
black market; and (3) impose mandatory reporting requirements
on doctors who suspect that a patient has obtained an organ from
a trafficked person. If these recommendations are not followed,
organ trafficking will continue to persist, exploiting the less fortu-
nate and violating the autonomy of its victims. HRB
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